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Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S. EPA:
The Seventh Circuit Gets Bogged Down in
Wetlands
Wetlands play a vital role in preserving water quality and the aquatic
ecosystem,' yet across the contiguous forty-eight states they are fast
disappearing. 2 Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) exercise joint authority over the dredging and filling of "waters of the
United States." The Corps issues permits for dredging activities and the EPA
retains a veto power over the Corps.4 In 1985, the Supreme Court upheld the
I Mary K. McCurdy, Public Trust Protectionfor Wetlands, 19 ENVrL. L. 683, 694-97
(1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 12-15.
2 Estimates of the destruction of wetlands range from 30% to 50% of the original total
in the contiguous 48 states. About 90 million acres of wetlands remain in that area.
MeCurdy, supra note 1, at 697-99. The annual destruction of wetlands is estimated at
458,000 acres. Jerry Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause: The Constitutionality of
Current Wetland Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 7 VA. J. NAT.
REsoulRcs L. 307, 307 (1988); see also Edward V.A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain
Protection and the Federal-Aid Highway Program, 13 ENvrL. L. 161, 168 (1982) (quoting
President Carter's estimate that 40 percent of the 120 million acres of wetlands catalogued
in the 1950s had been destroyed by 1977).
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). Section 404 is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (1988). The sections state, in part, the following:
§ 1311. Effluent limitations
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law
Except as in compliance with this section and section[ I .. [404 of this
Act,] the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
§ 1344. Permits for dredged or fill material
(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites ....
(c) Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal sites
The Administrator [of the EPA] is authorized to prohibit the
specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a
disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area
for specification . . . as a disposal site, whenever he determines . . . that the
discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect
on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning
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Corps' inclusion of adjacent wetlands-those which border interstate waters-
as part of the "waters of the United States." 5 The Court, however, specifically
declined to decide whether the CWA grants federal jurisdiction over intrastate
wetlands. 6
and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such
determination, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary.
(d) "Secretary" defined
The term "Secretary" as used in this section means the Secretary of the
Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(d) (1988).
"Pollutant" is defined as "dredged spoil, solid waste, ... rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)
(1988).
For a further explanation of the dual permitting jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA
under § 404, see Hoffinan Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United States EPA, 961 F.2d
1310, 1312 n.2, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1993); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 903 n.12 (5th Cir.
1983) later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986); In the Matter of Alameda County
Assessor's Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4 & 537-850-9, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1285-86 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also Kussy, supra note 2, at 200-01; Joseph A. Hedal, Significant
Developments, The Clean Water Act-More Section 404: 77te Supreme Court Gets Its Feet
Wet, 65 B.U. L. REv. 995, 1007 (1985).
5 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
6 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8 ("We are not called upon to address the question of
the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not
adjacent to bodies of open water, see 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(a)(2) and (3) (1985), and we do
not express any opinion on that question.").
The Court affirmed the Corps' jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands by finding the
Corps' inclusion of adjacent wetlands as part of the "waters of the United States" to be a
reasonable interpretation of the CWA. Id. at 135, 139. In so doing, however, the Court did
not determine the precise extent of jurisdiction provided by the CWA. See Guy V.
Manning, Comment, The Extent of Groundwater Juisdiction Under the Clean Water Act
After Riverside Bayview Homes, 47 LA. L. REv. 859 (1987). Accordingly, it has been
suggested that:
The greatest weakness of the decision is that it missed a chance to decide the law
respecting waters of the United States. Had the Court interpreted Congress' intent as to
the extent of such waters under the statute, it would never have reached the issue of
reasonableness of the Corps' regulations; they would have been either too broad, or not
broad enough, in light of the Congressional mandate. The Corps and the EPA would
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Federal jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands is vital if their destruction is to
be slowed. Without federal oversight, the development of many wetlands goes
unregulated, leaving them to be filled or drained with no attempt at mitigation.7
During the 1977 debate over the CWA, one representative lamented the
potential absence of federal jurisdiction, noting that "[t]he States have shown a
remarkable penchant toward development of these valuable and irreplaceable
wildlife resources."8
The Seventh Circuit, in three decisions on the same case-Hoffman Homes,
Inc. v. Administrator, U.S. EPA-first rejected CWA jurisdiction over
intrastate wetlands, 9 then vacated its opinion, 10 and finally upheld CWA
jurisdiction, but not for the specific intrastate wetland at issue.11 This
Comment, using the vacated decision of Hoffman Homes I to frame the
not be free to establish their own versions of the law as they see fit, and considerable
controversy as to the extent of the CWA would have been resolved.
Id. at 867.
7 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 327-33 (detailing the destruction of wetlands in Texas,
California, Washington and South Carolina because of the Corps' failure to exercise
jurisdiction and to require a permit application before filling or draining the wetlands).
Individual states may apply to the U.S. EPA to enforce their own permit program for
activities affecting certain waters within their borders. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (g)--) (1988). The
state program must include criteria nearly identical to the federal guidelines in § 404. 123
CONG. REc. 38,973 (1977), reprinted in 3 A LEGISLATPVE HisTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER
Acr oF 1977, at 419 (1978) [hereinafter 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. "In the past, one of the
greatest concerns of allowing the States to assume the 404 program was that they would not
be able to implement the program due to a lack of funds." Id. (statement of Rep. Harsha).
8 123 CONG. REC. 38,996 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 417-18 (statement of Rep. Dingell). Representative Dingell stated that:
I personally do not think that transferring permit authority to the States in this regard is
sound.... This is the dumping of dredge material and fill in our Nation's waterways
and most importantly in our estuaries and wetlands which are important to our fish and
wildlife resources, and, yes, to pollution control.
9 961 F.2d 1310 [hereinafter Hoffman Homes I], vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir.
1992) [hereinafter Hoffman Homes Ill, supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Hoffman Homes III].
10 Hoffman Homes II, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th
Cir. 1993).
11 Hoffman Homes 1m, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
The three Hoffman Homes decisions came after a procedural review of the EPA's
compliance order against Hoffman Homes. See Hoffman Group, Inc. v. United States EPA,
29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1180 (N.D. MI1. 1989), aft'd, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990).
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analysis, will argue that federal jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands is well-
established, despite the waffling of the Seventh Circuit and despite the Supreme
Court's refusal to address the issue in 1985.
Part I will discuss the nature and importance of wetlands and their relation
to the CWA. Part II will recount the history of Hoffman Homes L Parts nm and
IV will trace the analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman Homes I
when it rejected EPA jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands. Part III will examine
the EPA's claim that it has jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands because
Congress, through the doctrine of legislative ratification, implicitly authorized
the jurisdiction when it amended the CWA in 1977. Part M will conclude that
Congress did authorize this jurisdiction. Part IV will examine whether the
CWA, independent of legislative ratification, confers jurisdiction over intrastate
wetlands because of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Part IV
will conclude that intrastate wetlands are sufficiently connected to interstate
commerce to warrant regulation under the commerce power.
As an introductory note, intrastate wetlands are also referred to as isolated
or nonadjacent wetlands, because they do not physically border an interstate
waterbody. Likewise, interstate wetlands, those which do border interstate
waterbodies, are also known as adjacent wetlands. To avoid confusion,
"intrastate wetlands" shall be referred to only as such, while "interstate
wetlands" shall be referred to as "adjacent wetlands."
I. WETLANDS AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Wetlands occur naturally and also may be created artificially. 12 They
provide vital habitats to fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals. 13 In addition,
12 See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (1991), on remand, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Calif. 1992); United
States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1984).
An artificially created wetland remains subject to federal jurisdiction under the CWA.
Leslie Salt Co., 896 F.2d at 358 ("The Corps' jurisdiction does not depend on how the
property at issue became a water of the United States. Congress intended to regulate local
aquatic ecosystems regardless of their origin."); Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44,
48 (D. Idaho 1986) ("Plaintiffs contend that . . . the fact that they were 'artificially
created'.., negates the court's assertion of [the Corps'] regulatory jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act. This argument is untenable.. . ."); Swanson v. United States, 600 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (D. Idaho 1985), aft'd, 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Under the Stimson
rationale, Congress's [sic] power to regulate commerce extends as the bounds of navigable
waters are altered."); United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494, later proceeding,
615 F. Supp. 116 (D.NJ. 1984), aff'd sub nor. (unpublished op.), Appeal of Ciampitti,
772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986), later proceeding, 669 F.
Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1987), modified, 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1567 (D.N.J. 1988) ("[The
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wetlands provide benefits to humans in the form of flood and erosion control,
water supply and purification, groundwater recharge, and pollution
abatement.14 Wetlands also serve as recreational areas for activities such as
hunting, bird-watching, and photography. 15
The policy of the CWA16 "is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 17 Section 404 of the
CWA, i8 which confers dual jurisdiction to the EPA and the Corps, provides
for the Corps to issue permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
fact that part of the area may have become wetlands because of a manmade connection
between the site and tidal waterways is not dispositive of the Corps' jurisdiction .... The
Act applies to wetlands without reference to the manner by which they came to be in that
condition"); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) ("Polluting
canals that empty into a bayou arm of Tampa Bay is clearly an activity Congress sought to
regulate. The fact that these canals were man-made makes no difference."). But see Cty of
Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d at 466 (rejecting jurisdiction over an artificially created wetland
because of "the peculiar facts and unique circumstances" of the case). The Eighth Circuit,
however, specifically limited its holding, noting that "our holding does not challenge the
Corps' jurisdiction with regard to any other artificially created wetland-type environment."
Id. at 467. In 1989, the Eighth Circuit rejected a challenge-based on Oty of Fort Pierre-
to the Corps' jurisdiction over artificial wetlands, stating that the "argument is not well
grounded .... We were careful to limit our holding [in City of Fort Pierre]." United States
v. Southern Inv. Co., 876 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1989).
See generally Martin S. Lessner, Casenote, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Keep the
Birds out of Your Birdbath: It May Be Considered the Jurisdiction of the Anny Corps of
Engineers As a 'Water of the United States', 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.. 463 (1991).
13 McCurdy, supra note 1, at 696.
14 Id. at 697; see also Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316, vacated, 975 F.2d
1554 (7th Cir. 1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting congressional
debate over wetlands during the 1977 amendments to the CWA). According to one expert,
the preservation of wetlands along the banks of the Mississippi River could have eased the
flooding that occurred in States bordering the river during the spring and summer of 1993.
Doug McInnis, Wetlands Would Have Absorbed Rain, Eased Flood, Expert Says,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 1993, at 5C.
15 McCurdy, supra note 1, at 697.
For more information on the importance of wetlands, see Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 533 n.11 (W.D. La. 1979), later proceeding, 511
F. Supp 278 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983),
later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204,
1210 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979).
16 Before the 1977 amendments, the CWA was known as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA). Hedal, supra note 4, at 995 n.2.
17 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
18 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
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the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 19 The term "navigable waters"
is defined as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 2°
A definition for "wetlands" is not included within the CWA. 21
The EPA and the Corps share an identical regulatory definition for "waters
of the United States," one that encompasses adjacent and intrastate wetlands. 22
19 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).
20 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988).
21 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1312, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
22 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1992) (EPA); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1992) (Corps). See
also Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1313 n.5.
The complete definition for "waters of the United States" is as follows:
(s) The term waters of the United States means:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate
commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under
this definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (s)(1) through (4) of this section;
(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands)
identified in paragraphs (s)(1) through (6) of this section; waste treatment systems,
including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other
than cooling ponds as defined in 40 C.F.R. 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of
this definition) are not waters of the United States.
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1992) (EPA); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1992) (Corps).
Initially, the Corps construed "waters of the United States" narrowly and confined its
jurisdiction to those waters that were actually navigable in fact-"waters within the
traditional navigational servitude." Hedal, supra note 4, at 995 n.7. In Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, the court ordered the Corps to expand its jurisdictional
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The Supreme Court has upheld as reasonable the Corps' interpretation of
"waters of the United States" as including adjacent wetlands.23 The EPA and
the Corps include intrastate wetlands within their regulatory definition as part
of "[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
wetlands,... or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce .... ,"24
The EPA and Corps define wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."2 5
I. HISTORY OF HOFFMAN HOMES I
During construction of a 43-acre housing subdivision, Hoffman Homes
filled and graded a 0.8 acre bowl-shaped depression which, because of its clay
definition to "clearly recogniz[e] the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act." 392 F.
Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). See also Hedal, supra note 4, at 1009.
Theoretically, the EPA and the Corps could have different regulatory definitions for
"waters of the United States." That is unlikely, however, because an opinion from the U.S.
Attorney General states that the CWA requires consistency. See Manning, supra note 6, at
866 n.44.
See also infra note 25, for more information on the agencies' regulatory definitions.
23 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
24 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1992) (EPA); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1992) (Corps).
25 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1992) (EPA); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1992) (Corps).
See also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.
La. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 786
F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986), wherein the court explained:
It is quite obvious from this history that the terms "waters of the United States" and
"wetlands" are not terms of pure science. They are not meant to be. "Wetlands" is a
jurisdictional term, the product of the legislative process, of political pressure
groups .... Thus, the "wetlands" definition does not answer a scientific need, it
satisfies a practical, a social, a political need, the need to define the scope of Section
404 jurisdiction. It should be interpreted with this purpose in mind. The definition may
be scientifically incorrect, but that should not affect its validity as a jurisdictional
definition. A "wetlands" is what Congress (as reflected by the regulations) says it is.
511 F. Supp. at 288.
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bottom, retained rain water.26 The EPA found the depression to be a
wetland,27 asserted jurisdiction over it because of its potential use as a resting
spot for migratory birds,28 and fined Hoffman Homes $50,000 for filling the
wetland without a permit.29 The developer appealed to an EPA administrative
law judge, who ruled the EPA had no jurisdiction under the CWA because the
wetland had no effect on interstate commerce.30 The EPA appealed to its chief
judicial officer, and that officer reversed the earlier decision, holding that the
EPA had authority to regulate intrastate wetlands if they have a "'minimal,
potential effect' on interstate commerce." 31 The chief judicial officer found that
the EPA had demonstrated the minimal effect by proving that migratory birds
could potentially use the wetland.32 Hoffman Homes appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the EPA's purported jurisdiction in two
parts. First, the court studied the legislative history of the 1972 and 1977
amendments to the CWA and found that nothing therein indicated that
Congress intended the law to reach intrastate wetlands. 33 Then the court dealt
with its own precedent of United States v. Byrd,34 in which that court had
stated "that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to regulate 'all the
"navigable waters" within its constitutional reach under the Commerce
Clause.'" 35 Despite Byrd, the Hoffman Homes I court found the intrastate
wetland to be beyond constitutional reach under the Commerce Clause, and
thus beyond the EPA's jurisdiction under the CWA. 36
Five months later, the court granted the EPA's petition for rehearing,
vacated its decision, and ordered settlement talks between the EPA and
26 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1311, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).27 Id. at 1311.
28 Id. at 1320. See also infra text accompanying notes 107-22.
29 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1312. The EPA found that Hoffman violated §§ 301
and 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 ("Effluent limitations") and 1344 ("Permits for
dredged or fill material"). Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1311. For a partial text of those
statutes, see supra note 4.
3 0 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1312.
31 Id.
32 Id. For a history of the Hoffman Homes cases, see also Hoffman Homes I1, 999
F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
33 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1316.
34 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
35 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1316 (quoting Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1209).
36 Id. at 1321.
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Hoffman Homes.37 After those talks failed, the court issued a supplemental
opinion, holding that the intrastate wetland could be subject to federal
jurisdiction because of its potential effect on interstate commerce, 38 but that the
EPA had failed to show evidence of any such potential effect, and therefore had
no jurisdiction.39
III. CONGRESSIONAL RATIFICATION OF EXPANSrVE CWA JURISDICTION
In Hoffman Homes I, the EPA claimed that section 404 of the CWA gave it
jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands because Congress refused in 1977 to
restrict the expanding scope of section 404.40 During the 1977 debate over the
CWA, the House of Representatives approved an amendment that limited
section 404 jurisdiction to "traditionally navigable waters" 41 and their adjacent
wetlands.42 The Senate rejected an identical proposal, 43 and the final version
that both chambers approved had no restrictive amendment. 44
The Hoffman Homes I court examined the legislative history of the 1977
CWA to determine if Congress, by refusing to restrict section 404 jurisdiction,
thereby ratified the EPA's expansive construction of the law. 45 The court found
no such authorization. 46 Yet, under the doctrine of legislative ratification,
Congress in fact did approve an expansive jurisdiction under section 404, a
jurisdiction that reaches intrastate wetlands.
37 Hoffman Homes I, 975 F.2d 1554, 1554 (7th Cir. 1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256
(7th Cir. 1993).
3 8 Hoffman Homes 1M, 999 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1993).
3 9 Id. at 262.
40 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1314-15.
41 123 CONG. REC. 38,968 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 348 (1978) (statement of Rep. Roberts); Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1315. Navigable
waters are "those waters which are presently used or are susceptible to use in their present
condition or with reasonable improvement to transport interstate or foreign commerce."
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 281, and in 1977 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4424, 4472.
42 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 281 ("Section 16 amends section 404 of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act by limiting the requirement for a permit to
navigable waters and adjacent wetlands.").
43 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1315.
44 1d.
45 Id. at 1314-16.
46 Id. at 1316.
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A. The Doctrine of Ratification
The doctrine of legislative ratification "is a judicial doctrine that holds, in
broad terms, that reenactment or amendment of a statute with congressional
knowledge or approval of a prior administrative interpretation of parts of that
statute evinces congressional approval of that interpretation unless Congress
indicates otherwise." 47 Congressional knowledge of an agency's administrative
interpretation may suffice to demonstrate ratification, while sometimes explicit
congressional approval is required.48
Primarily, ratification is a matter of deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation. 49 More deference is given to contemporaneous interpretations
of an enabling statute and to interpretations that comply with the apparent
meaning of the statute.50 The judicial policy of deference is a long-standing
one,51 and in Riverside Bayview Homes52-the 1985 case involving adjacent
wetlands-the Supreme Court reiterated its allegiance to the doctrine: "An
agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of
47 James L. Conner It, Note, Environmental Law-Nationwide Pernits for Categories
of Waters Issued by the Corps of Engineers Under FWPCA Section 404: A Legitimate




51 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) ("It is by now a
commonplace that 'when faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration.'" (citation omitted)); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553
(1979) ("As this Court has often recognized, the construction of a statute by those charged
with its administration is entitled to substantial deference." (citation omitted)); SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) ("'The construction put on a statute by the agency charged
with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction
will be affirmed if it has a "reasonable basis in law."'" (citation omitted)); Zuber v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969) ("ITihis Court has announced that it will accord great weight to a
departmental construction of its own enabling legislation, especially a contemporaneous
construction." (citation omitted)); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381
(1969) ("fTThe equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it
is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.").52 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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Congress." 53 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged this policy of deference in
Hoffman Homes 154 and in Hoffman Homes 111.55
B. Legislative History
As noted earlier, "wetlands" fall within the terms "navigable waters" and
"waters of the United States." 56 The legislative history to the 1972 CWA
amendments contains no reference to wetlands, 57 and as noted in Hoffman
53 Id. at 131 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
The Court in Riverside Bayview Homes cited only a small portion of what the
Chevron Court stated. In Chevron, the Court set up a two-part analysis for reviewing an
agency's statutory interpretation:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to even more
deference. Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1313 n.6, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir.
1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 911 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.
1986).
54 961 F.2d at 1313.
55 999 F.2d at 260.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
57 Hoffnan Homes1, 961 F.2d at 1313.
The 1977 Congress, however, firmly believed that the CWA was intended to protect
wetlands. See 123 CONG. REc. 38,995 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 417 (indicating that the Clean Water Act of 1977 does not provide for "the
protection established in 1972 for our Nation's dwindling supply of wetlands.") (statement
of Rep. Dingell); 123 CONG. REc. 39,212 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 7, at 532 ("The Water Pollution Control Act was designed to protect the quality
of water and to protect critical wetlands in concert with the various States. In short a
responsible Federal role.") (statement of Sen. Wallop).
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Homes /,58 the only expression of intent regarding the meaning of "navigable
waters" lies in this statement from the conference committee: "The Conferees
fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." 59
During the 1977 amendments, wetlands and their importance were noted
extensively 60 when the House of Representatives tried to restrict section 404's
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview Homes61 found that
Congress, by refusing to adopt the restrictions, thereby accepted the Corps'
jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.62 The Supreme Court specifically declined
to address the jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands, 63 but the Hoffman Homes I
court found the reasoning of Riverside Bayview Homes-that adjacent wetlands
are hydrologically related to adjacent waters64-to bar EPA jurisdiction over
intrastate wetlands because of the supposed absence of any such relation. 65 The
Hoffman Homes I court also found the legislative debate to center exclusively
on adjacent wetlands66-a dubious conclusion. 67
58 961 F.2d at 1313.
59 S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.A.A.N. 3776, 3822.
60 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1315-16 (quoting congressional debate);
Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
816 (1987), on remand, 699 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1988) ("Narrowing our scrutiny to
Sections 301(a) and 404(a), we easily discern an effort to halt the systematic destruction of
the Nation's wetlands."); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp.
525, 533 (W.D. La. 1979), later proceeding, 511 F. Supp. 278 (1981), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986) ("A
basic policy of the FWPCA is the protection of our nation's wetlands and the important
functions they serve. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977
reflects an abiding congressional concern with the functional importance of wetlands.").
61 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
62 d. at 137 ("Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress' failure to
act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least some
evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative
construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically
designed to supplant it.").
63 Id. at 131 n.8; see also supra note 6.
64 iverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133-34.
65 Hoffinan Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1314, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
For an argument that intrastate wetlands are hydrologically related to adjacent
wetlands, see infra text accompanying notes 131-135.
66 Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1316.
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The Hoffman Homes I court, however, overlooked a crucial implication of
Congress' refusal to restrict the jurisdiction of section 404. Those desiring to
limit the CWA's jurisdiction proposed restricting the term "navigable waters"
to "waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands."68 As so stated, the
amendment implicitly acknowledged that without such a restriction, the CWA
reached waters beyond those navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands,
because if it did not reach those other waters, there would be no need for the
restrictive amendment. In other words, without the amendment restricting
jurisdiction to navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands, the CWA extended
beyond those waters. Thus, by rejecting the restrictive amendment, Congress
affirmed that the CWA's jurisdiction extends beyond waters navigable in fact
and their adjacent wetlands and reaches other waters as well.
In addition, the 1977 CWA provides "for the administration by a State of
its own permit program for the regulation of the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters other than traditionally navigable waters and
adjacent wetlands .... -69 This section demonstrates that Congress presumed
CWA jurisdiction over those other waters, but was willing to allow the states
to exercise jurisdiction in some instances.
67 For example, within the legislative history cited by Hoffman Homes I is the
statement that "[w]etlands... provide a spawning ground for a huge variety of fish and
waterfowl." Id. As waterfowl or fish may breed in either adjacent wetlands or intrastate
wetlands, no distinction between the two is drawn by the above statement.
See also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 533 n.11
(W.D. La. 1979), later proceeding, 511 F. Supp. 278 (1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Without
[§ 404], critical aquatic areas including swamps, marshes, and submerged grass flats, which
are such an important segment of this Nation's water resource and are essential to the
preservation of migratory and resident fish, bird and other animal populations, might
otherwise be irrevocably destroyed."); Jackson, supra note 2, at 317 ("[TMhe need to protect
'essential nesting and wintering areas for waterfowl' in wetlands was frequently cited in the
1977 congressional debates on the appropriate scope of section 404 jurisdiction over
wetlands."); id. at 324 ("[The senator's] statements and those of his colleagues evince no
intent to distinguish among types of wetlands for constitutional, jurisdictional, or any other
purposes. Congressional intent to preserve section 404 jurisdiction is thus just as clear for
isolated wetlands as adjacent wetlands." (citations omitted)).
68 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985).
As codified, the term "navigable waters" means "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988).
69 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4479 (emphasis added).
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Do those other waters include intrastate wetlands? 70 Congress gave no
explicit indication, leaving the definition of "navigable waters" unchanged:
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 71 The EPA has
issued regulations including intrastate wetlands as part of "the waters of the
United States," 72 and the interpretation is entitled to deference "if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." 73 Given
the expansive interpretation of the CWA consistently provided by the courts, 74
the EPA's interpretation of the CWA as reaching intrastate wetlands is
reasonable.
Furthermore, the EPA's inclusion of intrastate wetlands does not conflict
with Congress' intent. In rejecting the restrictive amendment, Congress
affirmed its original intent to have the CWA "be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation." 75  The Supreme Court has stated that
"[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to
70 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 325 n. 107 ("If Congress felt that § 404 did not include
jurisdiction over nonadjacent wetlands, it would be illogical to amend the CWA to provide
for turning federal jurisdiction over these wetlands back to the states since there would be
little or no federal jurisdiction over these areas to begin with."); see also id. at 327 ("By
rejecting such amendments, Congress even more persuasively demonstrated its recognition
that section 404 covered nonadjacent wetlands and its intent to leave that jurisdiction
intact.").
71 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988).
72 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1992).
73 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984)).
74 See infra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Manning, supra note 6, at 867
("Weaknesses notwithstanding, the Court [in Riverside Bayview Homes] confirmed the
broad interpretation of 'waters of the United States' as consistent with the view of the CWA
held by environmentalists, the EPA, and the majority of courts."); Jackson, supra note 2, at
325 ("One reason for concluding that ... Riverside Bayview applies with equal force to
isolated wetlands is that isolated wetlands serve many of the same functions as adjacent
wetlands. Thus, the reasoning ... in Riverside Bayview would seem to suggest that the
inclusion of isolated ... wetlands in the section 404 regime comports with Congress'
goals ....").
75 See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also 123 CONG. REC. 39,187 (1977),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 470 ("The conference bill follows the
Senate bill by maintaining the full scope of Federal regulatory authority over all discharges
of dredged or fill material into any of the Nation's waters.") (statement of Sen. Muskie);
123 CONG. REc. 39,209 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 523
("First, the conference bill retains the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation's waters
exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act to control pollution to the fullest
constitutional extent.") (statement of Sen. Baker).
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great weight in statutory construction." 76 The 1977 CWA reinforces the
original, expansive intent of the CWA. Therefore, the EPA's interpretation of
the law as extending jurisdiction to intrastate wetlands deserves judicial
deference because it meets the criteria of Riverside Bayview Homes: it "is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." 77
C. Congressional Knowledge or Approval
The question remains whether Congress, when it rejected the restrictive
amendment, had knowledge of or intended to approve the expansive
jurisdiction now claimed by the EPA. 78 When construing the CWA in 1977,
the EPA's interpretation of "waters of the United States" did not specifically
include intrastate wetlands, 79 as its current regulation now does.80 The 1977
regulation, however, did include
those other waters which the District Engineer determines necessitate
regulation for the protection of water quality as expressed in the guidelines (40
C.F.R. 230). For example, in the case of intermittent rivers, streams,
tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to
navigable waters identified in paragraphs (a)-(h) a decision on jurisdiction shall
be made by the District Engineer.81
Thus, in 1977 the EPA clearly stated that it would extend section 404
jurisdiction to intrastate wetlands, albeit on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore,
76 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969). "This principle
is a venerable one." Id. at 381 n.8. But see Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1315,
vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992), supp. op., 999 F.2d 256, (7th Cir. 1993). The
court stated that:
We hesitate to attribute any level of significance to Congress' failure to amend
section 404. The views of the 95th Congress in 1977 regarding the extent of the
section 404 permit authority established by the 92d Congress in 1972 are, at best;
very questionable evidence of the intent of Congress in 1972 .... "[S]ubsequent
legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring intent of an earlier" Congress.
961 F.2d at 1315 (citation omitted).
77 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135 (1985).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 48.
79 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A (1977).
80 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1992).
81 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A(2)(i) (1977).
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the Corps also issued regulations in 1977 that included "isolated wetlands" as
part of its definition of "waters of the United States."82
Debate over the restrictive amendment itself demonstrates that Congress
knew of the expanding jurisdictional role for the EPA and the Corps under the
CWA. The debate in both chambers was "lengthy," 83 and after each chamber
approved its draft of the CWA, a conference committee assembled the final
version. 84 In addition, the House of Representatives knew specifically of the
district court decision 85 that recognized the CWA's expansive role and ordered
the Corps to expand its jurisdiction. 86 Presumably, Congress knew of the 1972
legislative intent to expand the CWA to its fullest constitutional extent.87
Congress had knowledge, but did it approve the expansive jurisdiction now
claimed under the CWA? It is clear that Congress rejected any attempts to
shrink the jurisdiction. It is also clear that Congress approved the original,
expansive intent of the CWA: to stop pollution in all the waters of the United
States. Congress did not attempt to define a specific degree of jurisdiction;
rather, Congress exempted from section 404 certain activities that normally
would be regulated,8 8 and these exemptions are to be narrowly construed. 89
82 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978). The regulation first appeared on July 19, 1977, at
42 Fed. Reg. 37,144.
83 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985); see
also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 915 (5th Cir. 1983),
later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986) ("When Congress rejected the attempts to
limit the Corps' jurisdiction in 1977, it was well aware of the extension of that jurisdiction
beyond the traditional definition of 'navigable waters'.....84 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 137.
85 See supra note 22.
86 123 CONG. REC. 38,967-68 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 347 (statement of Rep. Roberts).
87 See supra text accompanying note 59.
88 H.R. CONp. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.A.A.N. 4424, 4475-76; see also 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 349
(statement of Rep. Roberts).
89 123 CONG. REC. 38,973 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 420 ("New Subsection (f) of Section 404 provides that Federal permits will not be
required for narrowly defined activities specifically identified in paragraphs A-F that cause
little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively.") (statement of Rep. Harsha);
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 535 (W.D. La.
1979), later proceeding, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[IThe
legislative history to the Clean Water Act indicates that the exemptions to the § 404 permit
program should be narrowly construed.").
[Vol. 54:809
WETLANDS AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Congress' re-enactment of section 404, unchanged as to its jurisdictional role,
demonstrates approval of the jurisdiction now claimed by the EPA.
In summary, under the doctrine of legislative ratification, Congress has
authorized the EPA's jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands. When faced in 1977
with attempts to narrowly define the CWA's jurisdiction, Congress refused.
Instead, it reinforced the original, expansive intent of the CWA. At the time of
its refusal, Congress knew of the broad interpretation given to the CWA by the
courts, the EPA and the Corps. By rejecting a narrow jurisdiction, Congress
ratified the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, which includes intrastate
wetlands as part of the "waters of the United States."
The EPA, however, need not rely solely on the doctrine of legislative
ratification for its jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands. The extension of CWA
jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands also conforms with Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE CWA
Even though Hoffman Homes I concluded that the CWA did not reach
intrastate wetlands, 90 the Seventh Circuit's own precedent compelled the court
to examine whether the intrastate wetland was within Congress'-and therefore
the CWA's-reach under the Commerce Clause.91 The court, noting a weak
relation between the wetland and interstate commerce, erroneously ruled there
was no jurisdiction. 92 The wetland's connection to interstate commerce,
however, suffices to warrant congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause.93
A. The Commerce Clause Power
Congress intended the CWA to reach all the nation's waters, to the fullest
extent possible under the Commerce Clause.94 The commerce power "is
90 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
91 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
92 Hoffrnan Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1321.
93 "The Congress shall have power.., to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;..." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
94 See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (1991), on remand, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("We
agree with the district court that Congress intended to create a very broad grant of
jurisdiction in the Clean Water Act, extending to any aquatic features within the reach of the
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complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution. "95 Under the
Commerce Clause, Congress may control intrastate activities that affect
commerce in other states. 96 Once Congress determines that an activity affects
commerce clause power."); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 802 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It is
generally agreed that Congress, by adopting this definition, intended to assert federal
jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the
Constitution, unlimited by traditional concepts of navigability." (citations omitted));
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 286 (W.D. La. 1981)
("Congress effectively implemented its intent (1) to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the
Constitutional limit, (2) to extend the broadest protection possible to the nation's full
hydrologic cycle .... ."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 715 F.2d 897, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1983)
("As the district court recognized, Congress had lofty goals in enacting the CWA ....
Congress expressly stated its intent 'that the term "navigable waters" be given the broadest
constitutional interpretation.'... The report ... explained the need for a broad definition
of 'navigable waters'. . .".), later proceeding, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979) ("The legislative history of the Amendments
establishes that Congress wanted to give the term 'navigable waters' the 'broadest possible
constitutional interpretation'... ."); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55
(9th Cir. 1978) ("This court has indicated that the term 'navigable waters' within the
meaning of the FWPCA is to be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation
under the Commerce Clause ('Congress clearly meant to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the
constitutional limit.')." (citations omitted)); see also Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d
992, 998 (7th Cir. 1984) ("In addition, we think that the CWA should be liberally construed
to achieve its objectives.. . ."); United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494, later
proceeding, 615 F. Supp. 116 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd sub non. (unpublished op.), Appeal of
Ciampitti, 772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986), later
proceeding, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1987), modified, 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1567
(D.N.J. 1988) ("Congress intended to exercise its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to
the greatest extent possible in order to protect our environment. . ."); United States v.
Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 1980) ("It is therefore clear that Congress
intended to protect the waters of the United States in a plenary, geographic sense, and that
wetlands are specifically included within that protection."); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) ("Congress by defining
the term 'navigable waters' . . . to mean 'the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas,' asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent
possible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."); Jackson, supra note 2, at 337
("[Tihe courts are repeatedly upholding broad agency authority under section 404."); see
supra text accompanying note 59.
95 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
96 Id. at 195; see also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942) and cases cited
therein; Swanson v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 802, 807 (D. Idaho 1985), affd, 789 F.2d
1368 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is little dispute that Congress has wide constitutional power to
regulate interstate commerce and activities touching thereon.").
[Vol. 54:809
WETLANDS AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
interstate commerce, "the courts need inquire only whether the finding is
rational." 97
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that any local activity-whether it
affects interstate commerce in fact or merely has the potential to affect it-may
be regulated by Congress under the commerce power. In Wickard v. Filburn,98
the Court stated,
But even if [an] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
"direct" or "indirect." 99
The size of the impact on interstate commerce is irrelevant to whether the
activity may be regulated under the commerce power: "That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial."1°°
The Court has extended these principles to classes of regulated activities,
again noting the irrelevance of any single activity affecting interstate
commerce. In Perez v. United States,101 the Court stated: "Where the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the
class." 102 Once the class of activities is deemed within reach of the commerce
power, the Court has never required the connection to interstate commerce to
be absolute. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,10 3 the Court
stated: "Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
9 7 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
98 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
9 9 Id. at 125.
100 Id. at 127-28.
101 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
102 Id. at 154 (citation omitted); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981)
("The pertinent inquiry therefore is not how much commerce is involved but whether
Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce."); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Moreover, the
triviality of an individual's act is irrelevant so long as the class of such acts might reasonably
be deemed nationally significant in their aggregate economic effect." (citations omitted)).
103 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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activities . . . which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that
commerce." 104 Again, in Katzenbach v. McClung,105 one Justice stated:
[W]e do not consider the effect on interstate commerce of only one isolated,
individual, local event, without regard to the fact that this single local event
when added to many others of a similar nature may impose a burden on
interstate commerce by reducing its volume or distorting its flow. 106
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may choose to regulate a class of
activities affecting interstate commerce, and whether each member of that class
individually affects interstate commerce is immaterial-it too may be regulated.
The Seventh Circuit in Hoffman Homes I and III improperly focused on the
specific wetland filled by the developer and ignored its membership in a larger
class of intrastate wetlands whose destruction may affect interstate commerce.
B. Intrastate Wetland Connections to Interstate Commerce
1. Migratory Birds
The EPA in the Hoffman Homes cases based its jurisdiction over intrastate
wetlands on the potential use of those wetlands by migratory birds.10 7 The
104 Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
105 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
106 Id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
107 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1320, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
This jurisdictional basis arises from a 1985 EPA memorandum. Jackson, supra note 2,
at 336. The EPA memorandum asserting the jurisdiction states:
'[If a particular waterbody shares the characteristics of other waters whose use by and
value to migratory birds is well established and those characteristics make it likely that
the waterbody in question will also be used by migratory birds, it would also seem to
fall clearly within the definition [of "waters of the United States"] (unless, of course,
there is other information that indicates the particular waterbody would not in fact be so
used).'
Jackson, supra note 2, at 336.
The Corps also asserts jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands, based partially on the use
of the wetlands by migratory birds. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726,
728 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd (unpublished op.), 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) ("'Waters
which are used or could be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines.'").
[Vol. 54:809
WETLANDS AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
interstate movement of animals (and potential for such movement) constitutes
interstate commerce.108 Federal courts have found the potential use of intrastate
wetlands by migratory birds to put those wetlands within Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.1 9 In Hoffman Homes I, the court rejected
108 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (finding that state law forbidding
out-of-state transport of minnows grown in Oklahoma violates Commerce Clause); Douglas
v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (holding that Virginia law forbidding fishing
within state's territorial waters by federally licensed ships owned by out-of-state residents
violates Commerce Clause); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding
federal control over certain birds pursuant to a treaty with Great Britain). In Missouri, the
state asserted ownership over the birds and challenged the act and treaty as interfering with
states' rights. The Court dismissed the states' ownership claim by describing the birds'
interstate characteristics: "Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone .... [B]irds that
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand
miles away." Id. at 434.
Although the Court in Missouri relied on the treaty power in rejecting the state's
challenge to federal jurisdiction, its analysis reflects modem Commerce Clause principles.
The Court noted that the protected birds "were of great value as a source of food and in
destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination .... " Id. at
431. "We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a
food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed." Id. at
435. Congress may properly invoke its commerce power to regulate the destruction of crops
that could move in interstate commerce. See, e.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); see also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985
(D. Haw. 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), later proceeding, 631 F. Supp. 787
(D. Haw. 1985), later procee&ng, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aft'd, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court upheld the enforcement of the Endangered Species
Act, enacted by Congress under the Commerce Clause, on behalf of a purely intrastate bird,
the Palila, which "exists in nature only on the slopes of the Island of Hawaii in the State of
Hawaii." Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 992. The Court noted that:
[A] national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of endangered species
preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of interstate
movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or professional scientists who
come to a state to observe and study these species, that would otherwise be lost by state
inaction.
Id. at 995. The court reached its holding despite evidence that the Palila was nonmigratory
and "remains within the confines of one state." Id. at 992 n.26, 993 n.28.
109 See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (1991), on remand, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
("[Mligratory birds.., and one endangered species may have used the property as habitat.
The commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the
Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and
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jurisdiction over the intrastate wetland by requiring evidence of human activity
with the birds;110 in Hoffman Homes III, the court required evidence of actual
birds' use of the wetland to establish a connection with interstate commerce.111
In both cases, the court improperly confined the commerce power.
Congress in the CWA intended to regulate all those waters that affect
interstate commerce, 112 and it did not distinguish between intrastate and
adjacent wetlands in the 1977 CWA. 113 The Supreme Court does not require
an actual connection to interstate commerce in every instance, only a plausible
connection among the class of regulated activities."l 4 If Congress' conclusion
that intrastate wetlands affect interstate commerce is rational, the Court must
uphold it.115
An intrastate wetland may affect interstate commerce by attracting hunters
and photographers who travel to the wetland from other states. 116 The
endangered species."); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Finally, the
lake is on the flyway of several species of migratory waterfowl which are protected under
international treaties."). But see Leslie Salt Co., 896 F.2d at 361 n.1 (Rymer, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that facts other than the presence of waterfowl
also contributed to the court's decision in Marsh); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715
F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd (unpublished op.), 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989)
("Although this Court has grave doubts that a property now so used, or seen as an expectant
habitat for some migratory birds, can be declared to be such a nexus to interstate commerce
as to warrant Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction, we do not here decide that issue.")
(negating jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands because the Corps failed to follow formal
rule-making procedure in determining its jurisdiction); Hoffman Homes Ill, 999 F.2d 256,
263 (7th Cir. 1993) (Manion, I. concurring) ("I would hold that the Commerce Clause does
not empower Congress to regulate isolated wetlands such as Area A. The commerce
power.., is indeed expansive, but not so expansive as to authorize regulation of puddles
merely because a bird traveling interstate might decide to stop for a drink." (citations
omitted)).
For another treatment of this issue see National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher, 662 F.
Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987), in which the court squarely posed the question: "Do the
federal defendants, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers, have jurisdiction pursuant to the
Clean Water Act... over a South Texas pond visited by migratory birds?" Id. at 549. The
court failed to reach the question because both parties voluntarily "concluded that a wetland
visited by migratory birds is a wetland within the jurisdiction of the federal defendants." Id.110 Hoffmn Homes I, 961 F.2d at 1320.
111 Hoffman Homes II, 999 F.2d at 262.
112 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 67.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 98-106.
115 See supra text accompanying note 97.
116 Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Hoffman Homes
111, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Throughout North America, millions of people
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destruction of intrastate wetlands may harm interstate commerce because it
would decrease the possible nesting grounds for migratory birds, 117 which
would reduce the birds' populations, which in turn would reduce the interstate
commerce generated by people traveling to hunt118 or photograph the birds." 19
Because of this effect on interstate commerce, intrastate wetlands fall
within the class of activities to be regulated by the CWA. 120 That the EPA
failed to show actual use of the wetland by migratory birds, then, is not
dispositive. Nor is it material that the EPA failed to demonstrate an actual
effect on interstate commerce by the specific wetland that Hoffman Homes
filled. The intrastate wetland falls within a class of activities regulated by the
CWA, and the class of intrastate wetlands, because of its potential effect on
interstate commerce, is "within the reach of federal power." 12' The Commerce
Clause requires no more. "Once Congress has . . . elected to exercise its
commerce clause power to the fullest extent, individual wetlands are covered
even if their destruction has no effect on interstate commerce." 122
2. Pollution
The CWA also provides jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands because of
pollution's interference with interstate commerce. It is unquestioned that
polluting the environment affects interstate commerce and may be regulated
under the Commerce Clause. The fact was recognized by federal courts as
early as 1971, before the first significant CWA amendments. One court has
stated that
annually spend more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory
birds.").
1 1 7 See COUNCIL ON ENvIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY 1970-
1990: TWENTIH ANNUAL REPORT 7-10 (1990), reprinted in ROGER W. FINDLEY ElT AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENvIRONMENTAL LAw 19, 21 (3d ed. 1991) ("Trends in
waterfowl populations, which rely upon wetlands during breeding and migration indicate the
declining health of wetlands. Populations of mallard ducks have dropped by about 40
percent during the past 20 years .... [Ejncroachment on wetlands has overtaxed even that
species' ability to adapt.").
118 Jackson, supra note 2, at 316-17.
119 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 317, for other examples of how the destruction of
wetlands affects interstate commerce (discussing pollution control, groundwater recharge
and flood prevention,); see also supra note 22 (noting that the definition of "waters of the
United States" includes waters that could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreation or other purposes).120 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
121 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
122 Jackson, supra note 2, at 319.
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[The nation knows, if Courts do not, that the destruction of fish and
wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some areas a
devastating, effect on interstate commerce.... Nor is it challenged that dredge
and fill projects are activities which may tend to destroy the ecological balance
and thereby affect commerce substantially. Because of these potential effects,
Congress has the power to regulate such projects. 123
According to a second court, "It is beyond question that water pollution has a
serious effect on interstate commerce and that the Congress has the power to
regulate activities such as dredging and filling which cause such pollution." 124
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,125 when the Court stated:
"Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found the
power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit
congressional regulations of activities causing air or water pollution, or other
environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State." 126
Despite the contrary conclusion in Hoffman Homes 1,127 the pollution of
intrastate wetlands by filling them does affect interstate commerce. The primary
distinction between intrastate and adjacent wetlands is definitional: their
proximity to other water bodies. Adjacent wetlands physically touch interstate
waters, whereas intrastate wetlands do not. Yet intrastate wetlands perform the
same functions as adjacent wetlands, 128 among them the "natural treatment of
waterborne and airborne pollutants." 129 Filling an intrastate wetland would
123 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971) (emphasis added).
124 United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
125 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
126 Id. at 282 (emphasis added); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 (1981)
("Congress adopted the... Act in order to ensure that production of coal for interstate
commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and
safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on interstate
commerce.") (emphasis added).
127 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1319, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). The court in Hoffnan Homes III did not address
pollution.
128 Jackson, supra note 2, at 325; see also id. at 326 ("Isolated wetlands, while not
adjacent to water bodies, can also affect water quality, and can thus also further the goals of
the CWA .... [lsolated wetlands perform the same kind of wildlife functions as adjacent
wetlands.").
129 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979).
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eliminate its pollution control services and lead to increased pollution, thereby
becoming an "activit[y] causing air or water pollution." 130
Moreover, the polluting of intrastate wetlands affects interstate commerce
because intrastate wetlands-although physically separate from interstate water
bodies-are not necessarily hydrologically isolated from those waters. For
example, intrastate wetlands may prevent the flooding of interstate waters. 131
As stated during the 1972 CWA amendments, "Water moves in hydrologic
cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source." 132 Because of the hydrologic cycle, water polluted at an intrastate
source may affect interstate waters. "[V]irtually all water everywhere on the
planet is linked. Whether a water molecule exists as water vapor in the
atmosphere, precipitation, ice, surface or ground water, it is all the same water
and it is all interchangeable. " 133 Furthermore, as one commentator has stated:
Many wetlands not adjacent to open water are nonetheless hydrologically
connected to it, and their destruction or pollution will eventually affect the
quality of the connected waters. And even those wetlands that are
hydrologically isolated from other waters are ecologically connected, serving
as feeding or breeding grounds for migratory birds that are key components of
aquatic ecosystems. The connection may seem small, but cumulative loss of
small, isolated wetlands, such as the prairie potholes of the northern Great
Plains or the playa lakes of the Great Basin, could have a devastating effect on
migratory shorebirds that are part of the ecological balance at other wetland
sites. 13 4
Because polluting interstate waters and their adjacent wetlands affects
interstate commerce, 135 polluting intrastate wetlands that are hydrologically
connected to those waters also affects interstate commerce.
130 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981).
131 Jackson, supra note 2, at 322 ("T]he adjacency test unrealistically assumes that
nonadjacent wetlands are 'isolated' from other water bodies when in fact they are not. For
example, prairie pothole wetlands occur in slight depressions in a relatively flat plain and as
a result they may retain surface runoff that would otherwise flood river channels that may
be miles away.").
132 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3742.
133 Jackson, supra note 2, at 322.
134 Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Reading of Corps
Wetland Juisdg'con Under FWPCA §404, 16 ENVrL. L. RErP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10008,
10011 (Jan. 1986).
135 Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d 1310, 1319, vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992),
supp. op., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
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V. CONCLUSION
Wetlands are a valuable natural resource, serving both humans and
animals, yet they are being destroyed by encroaching developers. Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act to protect the integrity of the nation's waters, and
to do so, it provided for the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to oversee
the dredging and filling of all bodies of water. The Supreme Court has held
that under the CWA, the agencies may regulate wetlands adjacent to interstate
wetlands. Before vacating its decision, the Seventh Circuit held that intrastate
wetlands cannot be regulated under the CWA. In a supplemental opinion, the
Seventh Circuit held that intrastate wetlands may be regulated, but it rejected
jurisdiction over the intrastate wetland at issue by requiring evidence of an
actual effect on interstate commerce. This Comment has shown that the first
decision was flatly wrong, and that the second decision improperly narrowed
the commerce power.
When amending the CWA in 1977, Congress reaffirmed the original 1972
intent to give the CWA the broadest interpretation possible under the
Constitution. Congress specifically refused to restrict the scope of the CWA,
noting extensively that to do so would have endangered the protection afforded
to wetlands by the CWA. Congress did not distinguish between adjacent and
intrastate wetlands, instead presuming CWA jurisdiction over both types.
Congress therefore ratified the EPA's construction of the CWA as giving it
jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands.
In addition, federal courts have uniformly held the CWA to reach to the
full extent of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Congress can
regulate intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce, and the destruction
of intrastate wetlands affects interstate commerce in two ways. First, fewer
intrastate wetlands would lead to decreased populations of migratory birds,
which would decrease the interstate revenue generated from activities involving
those birds, such as hunting and photography. Second, intrastate wetlands are
hydrologically connected to adjacent wetlands through the natural regeneration
of the water cycle. Destroying intrastate wetlands would destroy their
pollution-abating services and lead to increased pollution in interstate waters.
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Congress may regulate classes of activities that affect interstate commerce,
and no showing of individual effect is required of each member of the class.
Thus, the wetland in the Hoffman Homes cases and other intrastate wetlands
may be regulated by the EPA because the class of intrastate wetlands affects
interstate commerce.
Robert D. Icsman

